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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1157 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOEL LEE QUENTIN SCOTT, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2-17-cr-00151-001) 
District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 14, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: June 25, 2019) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________________ 
  
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 A grand jury indicted Joel Scott for armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113(d), and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime 
of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).  Scott entered a conditional guilty plea 
to preserve his right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his suppression motions.  The 
District Court never made any findings of fact to explain its reasons for denying the 
suppression motions even though the testimony the government offered at the suppression 
hearing was inconsistent.  Given that inconsistent and contradictory testimony, the District 
Court’s failure to make findings of fact has resulted in a record that is insufficient for us to 
decide the legal issues presented in this appeal.  Accordingly, we will vacate and remand 
the matter with instructions for the District Court to make specific written findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.   
I. 
Three police officers testified at the suppression hearing.  The discrepancies in their 
testimony is troubling and the differing accounts were never resolved by the District 
Court.  One of the officers, Corporal Sean Dougherty, testified that he stopped Scott and 
his codefendant in a residential development near the bank because they acted 
suspiciously by changing their direction after noticing him.  However, Corporal 
Dougherty also testified that he thought the men were acting suspiciously because when 
he approached “they continued to walk [normally] and ignore[d] my presence.”1   
                                                 
1 App. 113. 
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For reasons known only to the government, Sergeant Louis Montalbano, the officer 
who initially seized the cash from Scott’s pockets, was not called to testify.  The 
testimony surrounding his search of Scott and resulting seizure is inconsistent.  It is not 
clear whether Sergeant Montalbano “saw” or “felt” the cash which led to the challenged 
seizure and subsequent arrest.  According to the government’s response to Scott’s motion, 
officers discovered the cash during a patdown for weapons and therefore had the authority 
to seize it under the “plain feel” doctrine.  Yet, Corporal Dougherty recalled, Sergeant 
Montalbano “could actually see some cash, a wad of cash in [Scott’s] front right pocket.”2  
If that were the case, the District Court may have concluded that the officer could seize 
the money under the “plain view” doctrine.3   
However, Corporal Dougherty further testified that he took over the patdown and 
“could feel a considerable amount of cash in [Scott’s] pocket.”4  After removing the cash 
from Scott’s front right pocket, Corporal Dougherty testified, “I could feel another 
significant lump in his [front left] pocket that was consistent with cash.”5  On cross-
examination, Corporal Dougherty was asked about the encounter as viewed from the dash 
cam video.  This followed: 
Q. Where we see you there manipulating what was in his pockets? 
A. Feeling his pockets. 
Q. Okay. So at that point, you knew whatever was in his pockets was not a 
weapon, correct? 
A. Well, I didn’t know what was behind the big wad of cash. There could have 
been a small knife. So I was making sure, 1, that it was a wad of cash; and, 2, 
                                                 
2 App. 119–20. 
3 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374 (1993). 
4 App. 120. 
5 App. 120–21. 
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there was nothing that could poke me as I go and get it. 
Q. Okay. But you were squeezing it, correct? 
A. Yes, I would say that I was.6 
Under the plain view doctrine, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view 
an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a 
lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.”7  “The rationale 
of the plain-view doctrine is that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a 
police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment[.]”8  Nevertheless, the plain view doctrine cannot justify a seizure if “the 
police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without 
conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if its incriminating character is not 
immediately apparent.”9  Here, there is at least some evidence to cast doubt on whether 
Sergeant Montalbano actually “saw” the cash in Scott’s pocket.  For example, in the dash 
cam video, Scott is wearing an untucked shirt that may have been covering his pockets.  If 
the officers had to lift Scott’s shirt to observe his pockets and see the cash, it may not fall 
within the purview of the plain view doctrine.  Moreover, cash hanging from one’s pocket 
is not per se incriminating.10     
                                                 
6 App. 180. 
7 Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375. 
8 Id.  
9 United States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251, 257–58 (3rd Cir. 2007) (quoting Dickerson, 508 
U.S. at 375). 
10 See United State v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (noting that carrying large amounts of 
cash “is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct”); United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 
206, 210 (2d Cir. 1977) (billfold containing $3,200 “offered no immediately apparent” 
 5 
The “plain feel” doctrine derives from plain view.11  Under plain feel, “officers 
may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search.”12  But 
like the plain view doctrine, the contraband must be “immediately apparent” to justify 
seizure under plain feel.13  Here, Corporal Dougherty’s own testimony confirms that he 
did squeeze and manipulate Scott’s pockets when detecting the cash.  Thus, if “the 
officer[s] determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing, sliding, and 
otherwise manipulating the contents of [Scott’s] pocket—a pocket which the officer 
already knew contained no weapon,”14 that would contradict any notion that they 
immediately recognized the lump as “a wad of cash,”15 and the seizure would not be 
covered by the plain feel doctrine.  Absent any findings, we are left guessing about the 
immediacy, certainty, and amount of manipulation used to acquire knowledge about the 
cash seized.16 
The bank manager was also not called to testify.  However, Detective Stephen 
Brookes testified that the bank manager was able to identify Scott because he “was 
wearing black pants, and she recognized his build.”17  Detective Brookes later stated that 
                                                 
inculpatory evidence); see also United States v. $121,100.00 in U.S. Currency, 999 F.2d 
1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1993) (in forfeiture proceeding, holding that, “[a]bsent some 
evidence,” large sums of money provide “no reasonable basis for believing that the money 
is substantially linked to” illegal conduct). 
11 Yamba, 506 F.3d at 257. 
12 Id. (quoting Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373). 
13 Id. at 257–60. 
14 Yamba, 506 F.3d at 258 (quoting Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378); see App. 180. 
15 App. 119–20. 
16 See Yamba, 506 F.3d at 259. 
17 App. 293. 
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the bank manager was able to identify Scott because he was the shorter of the two men 
arrested.   But when asked whether the manager said “anything particular about [Scott’s] 
build,” Detective Brookes stated “no, not that I recall.”18  The manager had not seen the 
robbers’ faces during the robbery, both Scott and his codefendant were wearing dark pants 
when they were arrested and identified, and both Scott and his codefendant are black 
males.  Scott argues that by “build” the manager simply meant that Scott was the shorter 
of the two men arrested and presented to her.  He argues that he was therefore not actually 
“identified.”  He also claims that the manner in which the police conducted the showup, 
was unduly suggestive and constituted a denial of due process. 
 After the hearing, the District Court took the matter under advisement.  A month 
later, the Court entered summary orders denying Scott’s suppression motions without 
making any findings of fact or conclusions of law.  The Court’s orders contained a 
footnote stating: “The Court will further supplement the record of this case with Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law at a later date so not to delay the Defendant and the 
Government in preparing for trial.”19  Despite this statement, the District Court did not 
issue any written findings of fact or conclusions of law.   
 Subsequently, Scott entered a negotiated conditional guilty plea which preserved 
his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motions.  This appeal followed.   
                                                 
18 App. 294. 
19 App. 3 n.1; App. 4 n.2. 
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II. 20 
A district court judge is not required to make formal written findings of fact.21  
However, “[w]hen factual issues are involved in deciding a motion, [a district] court must 
state its essential findings on the record.”22  When the district court makes no written 
findings of fact, “we must extract findings from his [or her] oral decision at the hearing.”23   
In the instant case, not only did the District Court fail to make written findings of 
fact, it also did not make an “oral decision at the hearing.”24  Rather, the Court stated the 
following at the conclusion of the suppression hearing:  
Counsel, I’ll take this matter under advisement. . . I will issue an order. I might 
file subsequent findings of fact and conclusions of law in reference to the 
order. The order will come first initially, and then I’ll put findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on the record to support that decision.25 
As is evident from our brief discussion of the plain view (and plain feel) doctrine, 
the Court’s ruling on Scott’s suppression motions cannot be reviewed without knowing 
the precise circumstances that surround the seizure of evidence from his pocket including 
the timing and sequence of those events.  That, in turn, can only be determined if we know 
what testimony (if any) the Court found credible.  In the absence of testimony by Sergeant 
                                                 
20 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and we exercise plenary 
review of the District Court’s application of law to those facts. United States v. Perez, 280 
F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). 
21 See In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 387 (3d Cir.2006). 
22 Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(d). 
23 In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 396. 
24 See id. 
25 App. 366. 
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Montalbano and the bank manager, we can only speculate about what the District Court 
believed happened after the police arrived.   
Accordingly, remand is appropriate.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the orders denying Scott’s motions to 
suppress and remand the case to the District Court to make findings of fact resolving the 
troubling contradictions in these testimonies.   
